The purpose of this paper is to consider the following three problems:
(1) Whether selective conscientious objection is morally reasonable in general; and if so, (2) Whether selective conscientious objection should be recognized as a constitutional right by judicial interpretation; or (3) Whether selective conscientious objection should become part of any new draft ±aw that would be passed by Congress.
for a war to be morally justified:
(1) The war should be declared by those with authority to do so; (2) The war should be for a just cause, that is, for a morally right purpose; (3) The war should be conducted with a morally right intention; and (4) The war should be conducted with morally right means.
These four conditions come out of the very nature of the requirements for morally right action. For all conscious action involves four conditions parallel to the four conditions for a just war:
(1) A human agent performs an action; (2) The agent acts to achieve a purpose; (3) The agent acts for a personal motivation or intention; and (4) The agent uses a means to achieve his purpose and intention.
(1) A human agent performs an action. For example, an individual attends college classes. For this agent to act in a morally correct way in this case, it is essential that this person attends the classes freely. It would not be morally right for someone else to force that student to go to college. The adult person has proper authority to make his own decisions in life, whereas the child does not have such authority. In a similar manner, those with proper authority in our country, namely, the Congress, should declare when war exists. It would be immoral for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to declare war or to force Congress to declare war. Only the person with proper authority should act freely and intelligently to fulfill his responsibilities.
(2) A human agent acts to achieve a purpose or end. For example, the college student wants to get a college degree. This purpose needs to be morally right.
If the college student attended classes for the purpose of robbing the college cashier, the action would not be morally right as a whole. In a similar manner, a war should be fought to achieve a morally right purpose. An aggressive war which was fought in order to rob another nation of its wealth would not be morally right, but a war of self-defense against such an agressive war would be morally right. A person and a nation should act for a morally right purpose.
(3) A human agent acts for a personal motivation or intention. For example, the college student may want to achieve a college degree because of his intention of getting a good job. This intention needs to be morally right.
If the student wanted to achieve a college degree in engineering in order to become a terrorist, the action would ^ot be morally right as a whole.
In a similar manner, a .ar should be fought with a morally correct intention. Thomas Aquinas notes that: it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause [purpose] , and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says: The passion fcr inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, . . A the lust for power . . . are rightly condemned in war."' Both a person and a nation should act with a morally right intention.
(4) Finally, a human agent uses some means to achieve his purpose and intention. For example, the college student writes his papers and takes his tests in order to achieve the degree and get a good job. These means must be morally right in order for the action to be morally right as a whole. If the college student had someone else write the papers and take the tests, the student would not be using a morally correct means.
In a similar manner, a war should be fought with morally correct means. The London Charter of 1945, agreed to by the United States and its allies and used in the Nuremberg trials, identified the following acts as war crimes, as immoral means for fighcing a war: "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war cr persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plundet of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." Both a person and nation should use morally right means in their actions.
The conditions for a just war or morally correct war are in general the very same conditions for any morally correct action. An action or a war ought to be done: (1) by the agent who has the responsibility, (2) for a purpose or cause that is morally right, (3) with an intention that is morally right, and (4) with a means that is morally right. In general, from a Western moral point of view, we can say that those purposes, intentions, and means are morally right which respect the human person as an end in himself, in other words, which respect the human person as having inalienable rights.
Such is the general moral viewpoint which lies behind the claim that we need to dirtinguish between just and unjust wars. If we were to fail to make such a distinction by not judging the moral rightness or wrongness of the purposes of the war, the intentions of the nations, and the means used to achieve the purposes, we would prohibit ourselves from making any moral judgments about any of our actions. For moral judgments essentially concern themselves with the nature of the purposes and intentions of agents and with the nature of the means used by agents in their actions. Hence, we must make a distinction between just wars, wars whose purposes, intentions, and means are morally right, and unjust wars, wars whose purposes, intentions, and means are not morally right.
Lest this distinction between just and unjust wars be only a theoretical one and we conclude that all wars are unjust because they are judged to be destructive of the value of the human person, we must argue that war is sometimes necessary even though it has tragic consequences. Using the famous phrase of the Declaration of Independence on our inalienable rights, we may say, for sake of argument, that the state's natural purpose is to protect our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
If the state were forced into circumstances where the only way in which it could protect our rights as persons would be through war, then the state6must have the natural right to protect our rights by war. Using not only the criteria of (1) the proper authority for declaring war, (2) a morally right purpose, (3) a morally right intention, and (4) a morally right means but also these additional standards for judging the proportion between the good purpose to be accomplished and the many evil results of any war, we have the basic moral principles for distinguish ing between just wars and unjust wars. The tradition of Western philosophy and religious thought gives a substantial defense to those individuals who claim a moral right for being able to judge between just and unjust wars. Of course, the decision as to whether or not a war is just should be the decision of the individual adult. No one else has the authority for forming one's conscience other than the individual. If the individual did not study the available facts about a proposed war or even about any proposed action and did not apply the relevant principles of morally right purpose, intention, and means, the individual would be failing to act with the ability that defines him as a human being namely, his rationality. It is primarily the individual conscience which must make the moral decision about the moral quality of any war.
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' j Granted that we have defended the moral right to judge between just and unjust wars, we may turn to the second part of the paper which considers whether the Supreme Court should recognize the right of selective conscientious objection as a constitutional right. Perhaps these issues will come up again when the United States is again involved in an undeclared war, and then the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to apply the principles for discr ninating between just and unjust wars that are already inherent in our Constitution and treaties. Such a Court decision may not decide that a specific conflict was unconstitutional or a violation of our treaties; but even if the Court were to decide that a specific conflict was constitutional and in accord with our treaties, there still remains the question of whether selective conscientious objectors who sincerely believe that a given war is unconstitutional or a violation of our treaties should be given exemption and alternative service by legislative act? In considering this last question, we need to keep in mind that actions or refusals to act based on an individual's conscientious belief cannot be accorded an absolute right withoutgdestroying the basis for the authority of the state. ° For example, if an individual believed that he had a right in conscience as a large employer to discriminate against some group, then the equal opportunity employment laws could be made null and void by that individual. To allow anyone to claim a conscientious objection against any law would be to make a law-abiding society impossible. Political authority requires that citizens be legally bound to obey the laws. Those who would in civil disobedience break a law for moral or religious reasons should be subject to the penalties of the law.
However, we have seen that it is possible to build specific exemptions into certain laws. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Amish now have a constitutional right to withdraw their children from schools after eighth grade even though most others cannot legally do so. In a similar manner, Congress has allowed ministers to object conscientiously to the payment of the social security tax even though no one else in the private work force is exempted. Since there is ample precedent for building exemptions Jnto laws, perhaps Congress should allow selective conscientious objection because to force a selective conscientious objector to kill against his conscience is a very -ierious matter. 
